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STUDENT NOTES
Consumer Law-the Supervised Loan in West
Virginia
The supervised (small) loan is just one piece in the patchwork
of transactions characterized as consumer credit. It is designed to
increase the availability of credit for consumers in a form attrac-
tive to legitimate lenders who are permitted to issue loans with a
low ceiling on the maximum principal amount, and a high ceiling
on the permissible rate of interest.' The other primary feature of
the supervised loan, in trade off to its exemption from general
usury requirements, is comprehensive regulation. As a result, su-
pervised loan legislation is uniformly characterized by scrupulous
licensing and oversight requirements.
The one source perhaps most responsible for the current dispo-
sition of the supervised loan industry is the Uniform Small Loan
Act.2 The U.S.L.A. was the brainchild of the Russell Sage Founda-
tion which conducted an in depth analysis on why legitimate lend-
ers were unable to successfully compete with illegitimate lenders
in the early 1900's. 3 The Foundation's work-product, the U.S.L.A.,
continues to leave its mark on contemporary supervised loan legis-
lation: relaxed usury requirements accompanied by comprehensive
B. CURRAN, TRENDS IN CONSUMER CREDIT LEGISLATION, 16 (1965) [hereinafter
cited as B. CURRAN].
2 See R. BARRETT, COMPILATION OF CONSUMER FINANCE LAWS, 676 (1952)
[Uniform Small Loan Act hereinafter cited as U.S.L.A.].
The Foundation began its studies of the small loan problem in 1907. It
first encouraged remedial loan associations which are attempting to meet
the [loan shark] problem on a semi-philanthropic basis. By 1916, after
comprehensive studies, the Foundation determined that there was a de-
mand for small loans which could be supplied only by commercial
sources, that commercial lenders could not meet this demand legally
under maximum interest rates ranging from 6% to 12% a year, that illegal
lenders were taking advantage of small borrowers, and that general usury
laws aggravated rather than reduced abuses.
Id. at xiii.
3 See NATIONAL COMMISSION ON CONSUMER FINANCE, CONSUMER CREDIT IN THE
UNITED STATES 93 (1972) [hereinafter cited as NATIONAL COMMISSION ON CONSUMER
FINANCE].
[I]legal lending. . . flourished in the late 1800s and early 1900s in spite
of usury laws that presumably protected consumers. One report showed
139 active loan offices-all illegal-in Chicago in 1916.
Id. See also R. BARu'rr, supra note 2, at xii-xiv.
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regulation.' In West Virginia, the U.S.L.A. was adopted with slight
modification in 1933.1 Under the Act, the licensing and supervision
of the supervised loan industry was, and continues to be, vested
in the Commission on Banking.
Within the past decade the supervised loan industry has come
to be viewed as much more than a legislative response to abuses
suffered by the small borrower and small lender at the hands of the
illegal lender. Supervised loans are now but one member of the
overall consumer credit pool. 7 Consequently, the supervised lender
is now subject to a body of federal laws applicable to all forms of
consumer credit. Many states have, correspondingly, adopted
comprehensive laws regarding the availability and marketing of
consumer credit.8 Recent federal and state legislation has, in vary-
ing degrees, recognized the consumer as an integral part of the
marketplace.
West Virginia followed this trend with the enactment of the
West Virginia Consumer Credit and Protection Act in 1974.1 Arti-
cle IV of the WVCCPA supersedes the U.S.L.A. in the regulation
of the supervised loan industry in West Virginia."0 Furthermore,
the WVCCPA has made substantial changes in the law of West
Virginia regarding consumers' rights following default, the debt
I See, e.g., W. VA. CODE § 46A-4-102 (1976 Replacement Vol.) (requirement
that applicants promote the convenience and advantage of the community.) For a
complete discussion on the licensing scheme incorporated in the U.S.L.A. see J.
COLLINS, CONVENIENCE AND ADVANTAGE AND ITS BENEFirs (1957-1958).
5 1933 W. Va. Acts at 45. See also Cash Service Co. v. Ward, 118 W. Va. 703,
192 S.E. 344 (1937) (upholding the constitutionality of the U.S.L.A. as adopted in
West Virginia and a discussion of its purpose).
' The West Virginia Consumer Credit and Protection Act, W. VA. CODE § 46A-
1-101 to -8-102 (1976 Replacement Vol.), adopted the licensing scheme of the
U.S.L.A. with slight modification.
IThis is illustrated by the inclusion of supervised loan provisions in both of
the major existing model consumer credit acts: The UNnFoM CONSUMER CREDIT
CODE § 2.301 (1974 version); The NATIONAL CONSUMER ACT § 1.301(1) (1970). The
latter act does away with the traditional delineations made between different forms
of consumer credit transactions and treats all nongenerically as "consumer credit
transactions".
I See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 5-1-101 (1973); ME. REv. STAT. tit. 9-A, § 101
(Cum. Supp. 1977); Tax. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. tit. 5069, § 1.01 (Cum. Supp.
1977).
' The West Virginia Consumer Credit and Protection Act was passed by the
West Virginia Legislature on March 5, 1974, and became effective on September 1,
1974, although certain provisions did not become effective until September 1, 1975.
[Hereinafter cited as WVCCPA].
"0 W. VA. CODE § 46A-4-112 (1976 Replacement Vol.).
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collection process, and credit terms. It is therefore surprising that
such a wholesale revamping of the supervised loan and overall
consumer credit laws of the state has been attended with a modi-
cum of interpretive litigation."
With this in mind, this Note will draw from the WVCCPA and
all relevant federal laws in an attempt to define the legal relation-
ship between the consumer and supervised lender in West Vir-
ginia. This analysis will focus on some of the more significant
aspects of the prenegotiation, negotiation and postnegotiation
stages in the execution of a supervised loan in West Virginia prior
to either party's resort to judicial remedies.' 2 Moreover, particular
emphasis will be placed on the wealth of relevant federal law.
PRENEGOTIATION
a. The Parties
A consumer of a supervised loan in West Virginia is a "natural
person"'3 who incurs the debt primarily for a "personal, family,
household or agricultural purpose."' 4 It should be noted that al-
though the WVCCPA defines "person" as, among other things, an
organization, for the purposes of a supervised loan a consumer is
a person "other than an organization."" In the interest of uniform-
ity, those who receive supervised loans will be referred to only as
consumers, although the WVCCPA and the various related federal
statutes and regulations identify them by a variety of names.
A supervised lender under the WVCCPA can be either a per-
son or an organization authorized by law to make, or take assign-
ments of, supervised loans." A supervised loan is one in which the
principal does not exceed one thousand two hundred dollars and
the loan finance charge exceeds eight percent per year."? The fun-
" The only opportunity the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals has had
to cite a provision of the WVCCPA was in the case of Dawson v. Canteen Corp.,
212 S.E.2d 82 (W. Va. 1975) (requirement of privity of contract abolished in actions
based on breach of express or implied warranty).
1 A comprehensive discussion of judicial and post-judgment remedies pro-
vided by the WVCCPA in regard to all forms of consumer credit can be found in
Cardi, The West Virginia Consumer Credit and Protection Act, 77 W. VA. L. REv.
401, 480 - 515 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Cardil.
13 W. VA. CODE § 46A-1-102(11) (1976 Replacement Vol.).
, Id. § 46A-1-102(14)(b).
" Id. § 46A-1-102(28) and (14)(a).
IS Id. § 46A-1-102(44).
" Id. § 46A-1-102(45); see also § 46A-4-107(2).
[Vol. 80
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damental licensing criterion facing the applicant hoping to become
a supervised lender is that its "financial responsibility, experience,
character and fitness. . . are such as to command the confidence
of the community and to warrant belief that the business will be
operated honestly, fairly and efficiently."' 8 The Commissioner
must also find that an applicant has at least two thousand dollars
in assets and that granting a license "will promote the convenience
and advantage of the community."' 9 Licensees may only make
loans in an office or building in which they alone conduct busi-
ness."0 Assignees of supervised loans and debt collectors are also
subject to this limitation since they must first obtain a license
authorizing them to make supervised loans before they can take
supervised loans by assignment or undertake the collection of
debts."'
While there have been no reported decisions resulting from a
denial, revocation or suspension of a supervised lender license,
there is no doubt that the Commissioner can deny or revoke a
license based on the subjective licensing criteria in the
WVCCPA.21-' For example, a lender who has several civil judg-
ments entered against it for violations of the debt collection provi-
sions of the Act can hardly be regarded as "[commanding] the
confidence of the community."'1 -2 The WVCCPA makes no provi-
sion, however, for the initiation of license revocation or suspension
proceedings at the behest of a private citizen." ' In addition, the
usefulness of a writ of mandamus to compel the Commissioner to
initiate such proceedings is doubtful since the Act frames the Com-
missioner's authority to revoke or suspend licenses in discretionary
terms. It is, nonetheless, integral for the successful administration
of the Act that citizens report suspected or adjudicated abuses by
supervised lenders to the Commissioner. Otherwise the afore-
mentioned licensing criteria take on little meaning.
Is Id. § 46A-1-102(2).
19 Id.
20 Id. § 46A-4-110.
1, Id. § 46A-4-101(2).
21.1 See Id. § 46A-4-103.
21. 2 Id. § 46A-4-102.
2,.2 In addition, there is no express provision in the West Virginia Administra-
tive Procedures Act which would permit private individuals to initiate or intervene
in a "contested case" in order to dispute a license award or challenge an existing
license. See W. Va. Code § 29A-5-1 to 5 (1976 Replacement Vol.).
4
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b. Advertising
As is true with most consumer directed industries, advertising
plays a significant role in the prenegotiation stage of supervised
loans in West Virginia. Consequently, regulation of credit advertis-
ing originates from the premise that "a substantial portion of
consumer[s] ...are induced by such advertising and that if full
disclosure is not made in such advertising, the consumer will be
deprived of the opportunity to effectively comparison shop for
credit."' The sources of law relevant to advertising conducted by
West Virginia supervised lenders are twofold: (1) the regulations
of the West Virginia Commissioner of Banking,23 and (2) statutory
requirements prescribed by Congress in the Truth in Lending por-
tion of the Federal Consumer Credit Protection Act 4 and the pro-
visions of the Federal Reserve Board's Regulation Z promulgated
pursuant to it.21-
The Commissioner of Banking's Regulations require that, ex-
cept for mailings to customers already having loans and business
cards, supervised lenders must state the twelve hundred dollar
loan ceiling in all electronic and printed materials used to solicit
business.2 Supervised lenders are prohibited from referring to su-
pervision by "the State, the Attorney General, the Commissioner
of Banking, the Department of Banking or any other State
Agency," although they may advertise that they are licensed under
Article 4, Chapter 46A of the West Virginia Code.28 The more inclu-
sive category of licensees (supervised lenders, assignees and debt
collectors) are prohibited from advertising that a loan with another
licensee "will be paid or increased if the loan is transferred to the
advertising licensee."' Nor may they advertise in such a way as
to confuse their identity with another.28 As a final matter, all West
" H.R. REP.-No. 1040, 90th Cong., 2nd Sess. 1, reprinted in [1968] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 1962, 1974. The issue has been raised that regulation of con-
sumer credit advertising has had a "chilling effect" on creditors thereby causing
them to advertise without any specificity and leaving the consumer less informed.
See B. CLARK & J. FONSECA, HANDLING CONSUMER CREDrr CASES § 42 (1972)
[hereinafter cited as B. CLARK & J. FONSECA].
n [1974] 4 CONS. CRED. GUIDE (CCH) W. Va. 6525.
- 15 U.S.C. § 1684 (1974) [hereinafter cited as T.I.L.A.].
.' 12 C.F.R. § 26.10 (1977).
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Virginia licensees must retain a copy of all advertising for two
years following its use.'
The basic federal definition of credit advertising relevant to
the supervised lender is any commercial message made by a lender
in any popular medium including radio, television, newspaper,
magazine, sign, display, leaflet and mailing." Federal restrictions
on credit advertising employ what has been described as a
"floodgate methodology."31 A lender's advertisement cannot state
any specific credit term unless all of the other terms required by
the T.I.L.A. are stated concomitantly.2 Consequently, if an adver-
tisement states:
"We offer loans of up to $1200 payable in twelve easy install-
ments."
"No downpayment."
"No charge for credit."
"First installment only $10.00."
"No payments until June, 1978."
the floodgate has most likely been opened and the creditor must
disclose all required specifics clearly and conspicuously in proper
terminology.2 ' The specifics are:
(1) The amount of the loan;
(2) The number, amount, and due dates or period of pay-
ments scheduled to repay the indebtedness if the credit is ex-
tended;
(3) The rate of the finance charge expressed as an annual
percentage rate."
Supervised lenders who do not, as a matter of practice, issue
all of their loans on the same basis must set forth one or more
examples of typical extensions of credit in order to comply with
Regulation Z."
" Id.
12 C.F.R. § 226.2(d)(1977).
:' B. CLARK & J. FONSECA, supra note 22, § 42.
" 12 C.F.R. § 226.10(c)-10(d) (1977).
3 See generally Garwood, A New Look at Credit Advertising Under Regulation
Z, 91 BANKL L. J. 48, 59 (1974); Smyer, A Review of Significant Legislation and
Case Law Concerning Consumer Credit, 6 ST. MARY'S L. J. 37, 62 (1974); see also
[1978] 1 CoNs. CRE. Gums (CCH) 1700-1760.
- 12 C.F.R. § 226.10(d)(2) (1977).
w Federal Reserve Board Interpretation, 12 C.F.R. 226.1001 (1977).
6
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Violations of the advertising provisions of the T.I.L.A. do not
subject the supervised lender to civil liability or penalties." The
only express liability-related provision in the credit advertising
section concerns the nonliability of the media in which illegal ad-
vertising appears. 7 However, if a supervised lender "willfully" and
"knowingly" fails to comply with the advertising requirements, the
lender is subject to fine of up to $5,000, or one year imprisonment,
or both." The portion of the WVCCPA which provides for fixed
civil liability for deceptive inducement practices applies only to
consumer credit related to the purchase or lease of goods and serv-
ices and is therefore not applicable to supervised lenders." Despite
this absence of statutory remedies, the consumer advocate should
consider the legality of a given lender's advertising when basing a
claim or defense on the basis of fraudulent inducement or uncon-
scionability.0
NEGOTIATION
Once the competence of a consumer to receive and a lender to
issue and advertise supervised loans is established, one arrives at
that portion of the consumer/supervised lender relationship best
described as the negotiation phase. "Negotiation," as used herein,
contemplates every factor and writing which culminates in a le-
gally binding agreement. Although a comprehensive discussion of
the negotiation process is not possible here, four of the more signifi-
cant features of negotiation will be discussed: (1) limitations on
inducement practices other than advertising used by supervised
lenders; (2) the limits of lender discretion when denying a loan
request; (3) permissible loan terms; and (4) the required format of
the instrument evidencing a supervised loan.
a. Unconscionable Inducement
The WVCCPA makes two significant changes in the doctrine of
contract unconscionability relevant to the negotiation process of a
supervised loan.' Since the codification of the doctrine in § 2-302
1' See Jordan v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 442 F.2d 78 (8th Cir. 1971), cert.
denied, 404 U.S. 870 (1971) (held, that a civil action cannot be maintained for
violations of the advertising disclosure provisions of the T.I.L.A.).
3' 15 U.S.C. § 1665 (1974).
3' 15 U.S.C. § 1611 (1974); see also 12 C.F.R. § 226.1(c) (1977).
3' W. VA. CODE § 46A-6-106 (1976 Replacement Vol.).
" See text accompanying notes 41-51 infra.
" W. VA. CODE § 46A-2-121(1)(a) (1976 Replacement Vol.).
[Vol. 80
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of the Uniform Commercial Code there has been some question as
to whether a court can make a finding of unconscionability solely
on the basis of procedural abuses in the bargaining process leading
up to the execution of a contract.2 Procedural unconscionability
is characterized as a lack of "meaningful choice" by one of the
parties obligated on a contract because of inequality in the bar-
gaining process, while substantive unconscionability focuses on the
validity of a particular contractual clause in regard to public pol-
icy. 3 In the context of a supervised loan, the question presented is
whether a finding of unconscionability can be predicated on proce-
dural abuses in the bargaining process between a consumer and a
supervised lender alone, or whether the court must also find a
substantive abuse in the written contract. 44
One view of § 2-302 reasons that "merely finding a procedural
abuse is insufficient; for the draftsman has indicated that the pri-
mary target of the doctrine is the term that is unreasonable or
unfair . . . , [t]hus some sort of substantive abuse must also be
found. 4 15 On the other hand, a more consumer-oriented reading of
the U.C.C. unconscionability provision is that "[a] contract or a
contract clause that was unconscionable at the time it was made
could certainly be so only in the light of the circumstances sur-
rounding its making, which must of necessity include inducement
or solicitation practices."4 In Ashland Oil, Inc. v. Donahue47 the
West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals adopted a third possibil-
ity by holding that substantive abuses alone were sufficient to
establish unconscionability and that procedural abuses were irrele-
vant.47 '-
11 But see 2 NATIONAL CONSUMER LAW CENTER, CONSUMER LAW HANDBOOK 416-
417 (1972) [hereinafter cited as NATIONAL CONSUMER LAW CENTER].
43 Compare American Home Improvement, Inc. v. MacIver, 105 N.H. 431, 201
A.2d 886 (1964) (court employed a substantive unconscionability analysis in hold-
ing a contract unconscionable because of an excessive price provision) with Wil-
liams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445 (D.C. Cir. 1965) (court pri-
marily employed a procedural unconscionability analysis in holding a contract
unconscionable because of the defendant's indigency and limited education). See
Cardi, supra note 12, at 402-06.
" See generally, J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, HANDBOOK OF THE LAw UNDER THE
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 4-2 (1972).
" See J. Spanogle, Analyzing Unconscionability Problems, 117 U. PA. L. REV.
931, 943 (1969).
46 NATIONAL CONSUMER LAw CENTER, supra note 42, at 416.
' 223 S.E.2d 433 (W. Va. 1976).
,T. [W]e do not find it necessary to base our holding upon a dispar-
ity in bargaining power between Ashland and Donahue. In most commer-
8
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The WVCCPA conclusively resolves the questions arising from
the procedural and substantive distinction by stating that: "if the
court as a matter of law finds ... [t]he agreement or transaction
to have been unconscionable at the time it was made, or to have
been induced by unconscionable conduct, the court may refuse to
enforce the agreement . *.". .""This provision, in effect, codifies
the proposition that procedural abuses alone are sufficient to es-
tablish unconscionability as a matter of law. As such, the court's
holding in Donahue has no effect on the unconscionability doctrine
as it relates to supervised loans and other consumer transactions
which come under the WVCCPA. The WVCCPA unconsciona-
bility provision also avoids the interpretive pitfalls of § 2-302 of the
U.C.C. by delineating between substantive and procedural uncon-
scionability and permitting actions for either.'
The other change rendered by the WVCCPA in the complex-
ion of contract unconscionability is that courts hearing cases in-
volving supervised loans and consumer transactions in general
must apply the "setting" of the agreement as the standard for
determining unconscionability.0 This is significant because under
the analogous § 2-302 of the U.C.C. courts are directed to apply
the "commercial setting" of the agreement in determining uncon-
scionability as a matter of law. 1 This subtle modification has the
effect of lessening the legal standard necessary to establish uncon-
scionablity by sensibly distinguishing between consumer and com-
mercial transactions.
b. Credit Reports
Credit reports are a primary staple for the supervised lender."2
They provide quick and easy access to, among other things, the
consumer's credit history. With the growth of the use of consumer
credit, supervised lenders can be expected to increase their reli-
cial transactions it may be assured that there is some inequality of bar-
gaining power, and this Court cannot undertake to write a special rule of
such general application so as to remove bargaining advantage in the
commercial area, nor do we think it necessary to do so.
Id. at 440.
" W. VA. CODE § 46A-2-121(1)(a) (Replacement Vol. 1976) (emphasis sup-
plied).
,1 Id. § 46A-2-121(1)(b) (if the court finds any term or part of the agreement
to have been unconscionable at the time it was made).
Id. § 46A-2-121(2).
' See id. § 46-2-302(2) (1966).
52 See S. REP. No. 517, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1969).
[Vol. 80
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ance on credit bureaus and credit reporting agencies." According
to one source, there is a credit file maintained on over one-half of
all adult citizens in the United States." In light of the subjective
nature of credit reports, their use in determining the availability
of credit to an individual is subject to abuse.
For example, in Millstone v. O'Hanlon Reports, Inc.," the
plaintiff, a "highly respected Assistant Managing Editor of the St.
Louis Post Dispatch," had his automobile insurance policy tempo-
rarily cancelled when his insurer received a derogatory credit re-
port from the defendant." The report described the plaintiff as a
"hippie-type person, with shoulder length hair and with a beard
on one occasion,. . . [who] was strongly suspected of being a drug
user. . . and. . . was very much disliked by his neighbors."57 In
affirming a lower decision in favor of the plaintiff, the court ad-
monished the defendant for claiming that its report was reasonably
promulgated.
[T]he record ... shows that [the defendant's] agent devoted
at most 30 minutes in preparing his report. His report was rife
with innuendo, misstatement, and slander. Indeed, the recheck
of his investigation showed that he depended solely on one
biased informant; made no verification of the same despite [the
plaintiff's request] that there ... be a verification; and, finally
it took three days to recheck the original investigation, and
every allegation therein was found to be untrue."
O'Hanlon, although a case of extreme abuse, is indicative of the
broad discretion enjoyed by credit reporting agencies in piecing
together a portrait of an individual, unbeknownst to the individ-
ual, for credit purposes.
In recognition of the importance of credit reports to those who
extend consumer credit, as well as the significant potential for the
denial of credit to deserving consumers as the result of arbitrarily
drafted reports, regulatory legislation has been forthcoming in re-
cent years. On the state level, fourteen jurisdictions have enacted
fair credit reporting legislation to date." Twenty-two other juris-
53Id.
"Id.
- 528 F.2d 829 (8th Cir. 1976) (opinion by Associate Justice Tom Clark, re-
tired, sitting by designation).
5 Id. at 831.
37 Id.
' Id. at 834.
', See Geltzer, Fair Credit Reporting Act: Survey and Checklist, 94 BANKING
10
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dictions, including West Virginia, have had credit reporting legis-
lation introduced in their legislatures within the past year."0 On the
federal level, Congress has taken the lead in the regulation of the
credit reporting industry with the enactment of the Fair Credit
Reporting Act in 1970.1 The F.C.R.A. was enacted with the ex-
press purpose of seeing that credit reporting agencies function "in
a manner which is fair and equitable to the consumer, with regard
to the confidentiality, accuracy, relevancy, and proper utilization
of. . . information.
'82
Under the F.C.R.A., a consumer report is essentially any com-
munication "by a consumer reporting agency bearing on a con-
sumer's credit worthiness, credit standing, credit capacity, charac-
ter, general reputation, personal characteristics, or mode of living"
used for establishing a consumer's credit eligibility."3 The F.C.R.A.
also specifies to whom an agency may furnish a report,64 when
information becomes obsolete and therefore unreportable, 0 and
substantial limitations on the maintenance of investigative con-
sumer reports.66 Consumers have the right to receive the "nature
and substance" of all information contained in a reporting
agency's file maintained on them upon request, with the exception
of medical information. Consumers also have the right to dispute
the accuracy of information in a file and force a reinvestigation of
the report.6 However, it has been held that a credit reporting
agency is not required to give a consumer notice that the consumer
has a right to challenge or force a reinvestigation of information
contained in a report, and the statute is silent on the point." Fi-
L. J. 223, 246 (1977).
Enr. S.B. 132, Reg. Sess. (1977).
15 U.S.C. § 1681 (1974) [hereinafter cited as F.C.R.A.].
62 Id. § 1681(b) (1974). See also [1970] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 4394.
Id. § 1681a(d). See, e.g., Hoke v. Retail Credit Corp., 521 F.2d 1079 (4th Cir.





Id. § 1681h. The rationale for restricting consumers from access to medical
information is that "raw medical information should only be tendered with the
counsel of a physician or other medically trained personnel." CONF. REP. No. 91-
1587, 91st Cong., 2nd Sess. 7, reprinted in [1974] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS
4411, 4414.
" 15 U.S.C. § 1681(i) (1974).
'3 See Rseman v. Retail Credit Co., 428 F.Supp. 643 (E.D. Pa. 1977).
The Act provides that a consumer may, in those situations where the
[Vol. 80
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nally, and perhaps most importantly, consumers are entitled to
receive notice from the supervised lender whenever a loan is denied
or the rate of interest increased because of information contained
in a report. 0 This provision is the one most likely to give a con-
sumer notice that a credit file has been collected and maintained
on him or her.
Although a comprehensive analysis of the civil liability provi-
sions of the F.C.R.A. is not within the scope of the present discus-
sion, it should at least be noted that such a right of action exists.7'
If a credit reporting agency or a supervised lender willfully fails to
comply with any requirement of the F.C.R.A. a consumer may
recover actual damages, punitive damages, attorney's fees and
costs.72 In the instance of negligent noncompliance with any
F.C.R.A. provision an action may be maintained for actual dam-
ages, attorney's fees and costs.73 The existence of these rights of
action as well as the other rights granted consumers under the
F.C.R.A. provisions discussed earlier should help to make consum-
ers aware of the existence, use and abuse of credit reports as a
significant part in the negotiation process of supervised loans.
c. Lender Discretion and Discrimination
One must assume that the successful operation of a supervised
lending operation depends upon the freedom of the lender to pick
and choose among loan applicants. On the other hand, the growth
of consumer credit to a position tantamount to a necessity of life
completeness or accuracy of the report is disputed, prepare and file a brief
statement setting forth the nature of the dispute .... While it is clearly
the better practice for the consumer reporting agency to inform the con-
sumer of his right. . ., the Act does not place an affirmative duty on the
reporting agency to so advise the consumer.
Id. at 646.
, 15 U.S.C. § 1681m (1974).
" See, e.g., Haun v. Retail Credit Co., 420 F. Supp. 859 (W.D.Pa. 1976) (state
court F.C.R.A. action removable to federal court).
72 15 U.S.C. § 1681n (1974). See Nitti v. Credit Bureau of Rochester, Inc., 84
Misc.2d 277, 375 N.Y.S.2d 817, 821 (1975).
In determining the proper amount of punitive damages to be as-
sessed, the court must consider a variety of things; the remedial purpose
of the Act, the harm to consumers intended to be avoided or corrected
thereby, the manner in which the defendant conducted its business and
dealt with the plaintiff, as well as the defendant's income and net worth.
,1 Id. at 821. See also Millstone v. O'Hanlon Reports, Inc., supra note 55; 15
U.S.C. § 16810.
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requires the imposition of public policy on lender discretion.7 Such
necessity is suggested by the Federal Equal Credit Opportunity
Act 715 which distinguishes a supervised lender's discretion in the
award or denial of a loan based on bona-fide economic risk reasons,
from lender discrimination based on social prejudice. The
E.C.O.A. places a general prohibition on prejudice-based lender
discrimination-in regard to sex, marital status, race, color, reli-
gion, national origin, or on the fact that an applicant receives
public assistance-in relation to the extension, renewal or contin-
uation of consumer credit. As originally enacted, the E.C.O.A.
prohibited discrimination on the basis of sex or marital status.
7 It
was amended by Congress, effective March 23, 1977, so as to ex-
tend the prohibition on credit discrimination to the other forms
noted.77 Thus, although the E.C.O.A. is primarily directed at sex-
based discrimination,78 it must be read in light of the general prin-
ciple that credit discrimination on any prohibited basis which re-
lates to any aspect of a credit transaction is illegal."
Effectuation of the E.C.O.A. is endowed in the Federal Re-
serve Board which has, pursuant to the E.C.O.A., promulgated
Regulation B1° to circumvent credit discrimination at three stages:
7' See NATIONAL COMMISSION ON CONSuMER FiNANCE, supra note 3, at 5 to 21.
Consumer credit has been an economic fact of life since Colonial days.
The rapid growth of consumer credit in the United States has in large
part been a natural accompaniment to the growth of other forms of debt,
both public and private .... Consumers' use of credit has been encour-
aged by their rising discretionary income, the urbanization of the popula-
tion, and the influx of younger consumers into the market.
Id. at 21.
7 15 U.S.C. § 1691 (Cum. Supp. 1977) [hereinafter cited as E.C.O.A.].
7' The Congress finds that there is a need to insure that the various
financial institutions and other firms engaged in the extension of credit
exercise their responsibility to make credit available with fairness, impar-
tiality, and without discrimination on the basis of sex or marital status.
Pub. L. 93-495 § 502 (1974) (findings and purpose of the Equal Credit
Opportunity Act not made part of the enacted statute).
" Pub. L. 94-239 (1976). See generally Note, Consumer Credit Protection-The
Equal Credit Opportunity Act Amendments of 1976, 50 TEmp. L.Q. 388 (1977).
7' See 12 C.F.R. § 202.4 (1977).
" 15 U.S.C. § 1691(a)(1)(2) (Cum. Supp. 1977).
" 12 C.F.R. § 202 (1977). The agency invested with the authority to promul-
gate regulations is the Federal Reserve Board pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1691(b)
(Cum. Supp. 1977). However, the enforcement of the E.C.O.A. and Regulation B
is vested in a multitude of federal agencies, the principal of which is the Federal
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(1) the credit application process; (2) the evaluation of the con-
sumer's credit worthiness; and (3) the dissemination of credit in-
formation. In regard to the first state - the credit application pro-
cess - Regulation B prohibits lenders from discouraging applica-
tions on the basis of a prohibited criterion81 and comprehensively
lists information which lenders are prohibited from requesting.2
More specifically, in the case of a secured supervised loan applica-
tion by an individual, lenders are prohibited from requesting infor-
mation concerning: whether any of the applicant's income is de-
rived from alimony, child support, or separate maintenance pay-
ments unless the lender concomitantly discloses that such infor-
mation need not be revealed if the consumer so desires;3 the sex
of an applicant;" sex designations such as Ms., Miss., Mrs. and
Mr. unless it is clearly disclosed that such designations are op-
tional;m the applicant's birth control practices," intentions as to
bearing children and capability to bear children;87 and the con-
sumer's race, color, religion or nationality.8 As a final matter, the
application form used by the supervised lender must use sex-
neutral terminology.88
The second stage - evaluation of the consumer's credit worthi-
ness - is covered by a variety of permissible and prohibited factors
a lender may consider." Regulation B adopts the "effects test"
enunciated by the United States Supreme Court in Griggs v. Duke
Power Co."' and Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody"2 as the basis for
the determination of whether a lender has discriminated on a pro-
hibited basis. While both Griggs and Moody involved challenges
to employment practices under Title VII of the Equal Employment
Opportunity Act, their applicability to the credit area is obvious. 3
42 Fed. Reg. 1254 (1977) (to be codified in 12 C.F.R. § 202.5(a)).
Id. (to be codified in 12 C.F.R. § 202.5(d)(1) to (5)).
" Id. (to be codified in 12 C.F.R. § 202.5(d)(2)).
42 Fed. Reg. 1255 (1977) (to be codified in 12 C.F.R. § 202.5(d)(3)).
r Id.
" Id. (to be codified in 12 C.F.R. § 202.5(d)(4)).
SId.
Id. (to be codified in 12 C.F.R. § 202.5(d)(5)).
' Id. (to be codified in 12 C.F.R. § 202.5(d)(3)).
" Id. (to be codified in 12 C.F.R. § 202.6(b)(1) to (7)).
401 U.S. 424 (1971).
422 U.S. 405 (1975).
42 Fed. Reg. 1255, n. 7 (1977) (to be codified in 12 C.F.R. § 202.6):
The legislative history of the Act indicates that the Congress intended an
'effects test' concepts as outlined in the employment field by the Su-
preme Court in the cases of Griggs v. Duke Power Co ... and
14
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As the Court stated in Moody: "Title VII is not concerned with the
employer's 'good intent or absence of discriminatory intent' for
'Congress directed the thrust of the Act to the consequences of
employment practices, not simply the motivation.' "14 Thus, dis-
crimination in the evaluation of a supervised loan application
should not proceed on the basis of finding a discriminatory intent
on the part of the lender. Instead, using the Griggs-Moody "effects
test" one must pinpoint the discriminatory consequences of the
methods or criteria used by the lender in reaching the decision to
deny the consumer's supervised loan application.
The final stage of E.C.O.A. coverage-the dissemination of
credit information-focuses on the elimination of the practice
whereby creditors build files on the husband alone where both
spouses are contractually liable." As a result of this practice, mar-
ried women have experienced difficulty in establishing credit his-
tories. Under the E.C.O.A., if a supervised loan is such that both
spouses are contractually liable, the supervised lender must desig-
nate the account to reflect the participation of both spouses. The
supervised lender must also use the required designation when
furnishing information to consumer reporting agencies so that
agencies will have "access to information about the account in the
name of each spouse."97 The E.C.O.A. provides for a mandatory
notification procedure for all accounts established prior to June 1,
1977.11 This permits consumers who executed supervised loan
agreements prior to that date to at least have the opportunity to
require that their supervised loan be properly designated in ac-
cordance with the E.C.O.A. for every currently executory super-
vised loan agreement in West Virginia.
d. Disclosures
The most significant influence the Truth in Lending portion
of the Federal Consumer Credit Protection Act has had on con-
Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, . . . to be applicable to a creditor's
determination of credit worthiness. See Senate Report to accompany
H.R. 6516, No. 94-589, pp. 4-5; House Report to accompany H.R. 6516,
No. 94-210, p. 5.
' 401 U.S. at 432, cited in 422 U.S. at 422.
" For a discussion on the difficulties women face in trying to obtain consumer
credit see National Commission on Consumer Finance, supra note 3, at 152.
" 42 Fed. Reg. 1260 (1977) (to be codified in 12 C.F.R. § 202.10(a)).
" Id. (to be codified in 12 C.F.R. § 202.10(a)(2)).
I d. (to be codified in 12 C.F.R. § 202.10(b)).
[Vol. 80
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sumer credit is the institutionalization of uniform disclosures in
most consumer credit agreements.9 The basic theory behind dis-
closures is that by providing consumers with uniform credit terms
the opportunity for effective comparison shopping by consumers
will be enhanced. 0 Disclosures also proceed from the recognition
that credit agreements are mathematically complex and conse-
quently "[t]he informed use of credit . . .[can only result] . . .
from an awareness of the cost thereof by consumers."'0 1 Thus,
while the disclosures required to be in every instrument evidencing
a supervised loan in West Virginia do not effect the substance or
terms of an agreement, they do indeed structure the format and
tenor of the agreement as well as the overall supervised loan mar-
ket.' 2 This discussion on the disclosures required to be incorpo-/.
rated in supervised loan agreements will integrate the loan terms
relevant to a precomputed supervised loan mandated by the
WVCCPA and the Commissioner of Banking's regulations'03 with
the T.I.L.A. disclosures in order to draw a comprehensive picture
of the disclosure portion of the negotiation process.
11 The Truth in Lending Act is Title I of the Federal Consumer Credit Protec-
tion Act. 15 U.S.C. § 1601 to § 1665 (1974).
- See NATIONAL COMMISSION ON CONSuMER FINANCE, supra note 3, at 169.
Prior to the enactment of the . . . (T.I.L.A.) . . . information given
consumers about their credit arrangements ranged from very little to
what . . . (T.I.L.A.) . . .now requires. Most consumers were told the
amount of their monthly payments and due dates. Provisions for addi-
tional information varied widely among credit grantors, types of credit,
and states. The greatest lack of uniformity was in the quotation of the
amount and rate of the finance charge. Some credit grantors provided
neither figure, showing only the number and amount of monthly pay-
ments and the dollar sum. While many creditors disclosed the dollar
amount of the finance charge or provided enough data so that it could
be ascertained, they stated the rate of charge in a variety of ways.
Id.
,01 5 U.S.C. § 1601 (1974).
112 See generally Kinter, A Primer on Truth and Lending, 13 ST. Louis L.J. 501,
522 (1969); NATONAL CONSUMER LAw CENTER, 1 TRUTH IN LENDING, 2524 (1971).
'" Other substantive controls adopted by the WVCCPA and the regulations
promulgated by the West Virginia Commissioner of Banking which are not part of
T.I.L.A. disclosures are worthy of note. West Virginia's long standing policy against
the enforcement of cognovit notes, a contractual clause whereby the consumer
confesses judgment in lieu of notice or hearing, is incorporated in W. VA. CODE §
46A-2-117 (Replacement Vol. 1976). See also Cardi, supra note 12, at 480-485.
Supervised lenders are prohibited from using multiple loan agreements with the
intent of obtaining a higher finance charge than otherwise permitted. W. VA. ConE
46A-4-108 (Replacement Vol. 1976). Finally, lenders are required to refrain from
refinancing and consolidating supervised loans "where no reasonable gain accrues
to the consumer" and may only do so when the resulting principal does not exceed
$1,200. 4 CoNs. CRED. GUIDE (CCH) 1 6526 (1974).
16
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DISCLOSURE STATEMENT OF LOAN (1)
Borrower: Lender:
Date:
Total of Finance (2) Annual Per- Credit Life Disability Property
Payments Charge Amount centage Rate: Insurance Insurance Insurance
(5) (3) Financed (4) Charge Charge Charge
Payable in: Due Dates of Payments Amount of Payments
Consecutive Recording
Monthly Others:





CREDIT LIFE AND DISABILITY INSURANCE is not required
(6) to obtain this loan. No charge is made for credit insurance and no
credit insurance is provided unless the borrower signs the appropri-
ate statement below:
(a) The cost for Credit Life Insurance alone will be $.
for the term of the credit.
(b) The cost for Credit Life and Disability Insurance will be
$- _ for the term of the credit.
I desire Credit Life I desire Credit I DO NOT want Credit
and Disability Insurance. Life Insurance only. Life or Disability Insurance.
(Date) (Signature) (Date) (Signature) (Date) (Signature)
(9) REBATE FOR PREPAYMENT IN FULL. If the loan contract is
prepaid in full by cash, a new loan, refinancing or otherwise before
the final installment date, the borrower shall receive a rebate of pre-
computed interest computed under Rule of 78's.
(7) DEFAULT CHARGE. [The creditor should set forth the amount, or
method of computing the amount, of any default, delinquency, or
similar charges payable in the event of late payments.]
SECURITY (8)
A. E] This Loan is Secured By a Security DESCRIPTION
Agreement of Even Date covering ....... []Motor Vehicle(s): Make . Serial No.: ........
The Security Agreement will 0 Household Goods & Appliances of the follow-
secure future or other indebted- ing description : ... ...........
ness and w ill cover after ...............................................................
acquired property.
E] Other: (Describe) ............................
B. El This Loan is Unsecured.
I Acknowledge Receipt of a Copy of this Statement.
Witness: ................... Borrower: .....................
(The bold'numerals correspond to the paragraphs which follow.)
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1. The disclosures required by the T.I.L.A. to identify the
transaction may appear either on the instrument itself or on a
separate statement properly identified."5 The model statement il-
lustrates the latter of the two.
2. The amount financed must be identified and is defined as
the sum of the principal amount of the loan to be received by the
consumer and any additional charges which the consumer must
bear such as the cost of insurance premiums or taxes. '
3. The finance charge, in the context of a supervised loan, is
the sum of all charges payable directly or indirectly by the con-
sumer to the supervised lender incident to the extension of credit
excluding default, delinquency or deferral charges.107 The metho-
dology employed by the WVCCPA is to regulate supervised loan
terms by setting maximum allowable finance charges in the follow-
ing manner:
a. 36% per year where the unpaid balance of the principal is
$200.00 or less.
b. 24% per year where the unpaid balance of the principal is
between $201.00 and $600.00.
c. 18% per year where the unpaid balance of the principal is
between $600.01 and $1,200.001s
The finance charge is calculated on the assumption that all sched-
uled payments will be made when due.10 Moreover, the supervised
lender is permitted to "reasonably establish" and use ranges in
computing the finance charge so that a single loan finance charge
will apply to all principal amounts within a specified range.110
4. The annual percentage rate, which must be conspicuously
disclosed, is the means by which the rate of interest of the super-
vised loan must be expressed."' It is computed in conjunction with
the actuarial method and must be disclosed with an accuracy to
104 The sample disclosure is taken in part from 1 CONS. CRED. GUIDE (CCH)
3855 (1978).
10 12 C.F.R. § 226.8(a)(1) - (2) (1977).
"' Id. § 226.2(f) (1977).
,o Id. § 226.4; W. VA. CODE § 46A-1-102(23) (1976 Replacement Vol.)
1 W. VA. CODE § 46A-4-107(2) (1976 Replacement Vol.).
' Id. § 46A-4-107(3)(a).
11 The use of ranges and the computation of finance charges in the context of
a supervised loan are discussed extensively in Cardi, supra note 12, at 401, 438 -
449, 479.
11 12 C.F.R. § 226.2(g) (1977).
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the nearest quarter of one percent."' Computation of the annual
percentage rate is an extremely difficult process."' Consequently,
supervised lenders often rely on annual percentage rate tables pub-
lished yearly by the Federal Reserve Board or formulated by a
private concern in accordance with Regulation Z."1
5. Supervised lenders must disclose the payment schedule
which is "the number, amount, and due dates or periods of pay-
ments scheduled to repay the indebtedness""' and the total of
payments. The term total of payments must be included and it
constitutes the sum of all payments the consumer is required to
make to discharge the indebtedness. The maximum time periods
in which the consumer can pay back the loan, in the supervised
loan context, is dependent upon the amount of principal fi-
nanced." 6 Such maximum times are as follows:
Amount Financed Maximum Period Additional 15-day
of Time to Pay Grace Period if
Back Required
up to $300.00 24 Months yes
$300.01 to $800 30 Months yes
$800.01 to $1,200 36 Months yes
It is important to note that "balloon payments," payments which
are greater than twice the amount of any other scheduled payment,
cannot be incorporated in the payment schedule of a supervised
loan."7
6. Credit Life and disability insurance are common ingredi-
ents in supervised loans."8 They provide supervised lenders with
the added security of the benefits of an insurance policy in case of
the fortuitous death or injury of the consumer, as well as additional
profit from the sale of the policy. The form of disclosure of insur-
ance charges hinges on whether the insurance is voluntarily pur-
1 Id. § 226.5(b)(1) - (2) (1977).
" See id. § 226.5 (Supplement 1) (issued by the Federal Reserve Board on
January 31, 1969, 34 Fed. Reg. 2017 (1969)).
" Id. § 226.5(c) (1977).
" Id. § 226.5(c). If a lender wishes to incorporate an extended due date for the
first scheduled payment into the payment schedule of a precomputed supervised
loan, the extended period can not be longer than one month and fifteen days. See
[19741 4 CONS. CRED. GUIDE (CCH) W. Va. 6530.
HI [1974] 4 CONS. CraD. GUIDE (CCH) W. Va. 6521.
117 Id.
119 See generally C. HUBBARD, CONSUMER CREDrr LIFE AND DISABILITY INSURANCE
(1973); NATONAL COMMISSION ON CONSUMER FINANCE, supra note 3, at 83-90.
[Vol. 80
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chased by the consumer and therefore not a condition of the loan
agreement, or the insurance is required by the supervised lender
as incident to and in connection with the extension of credit.
If the consumer voluntarily decides to purchase a credit life
or disability policy, the consumer must affirmatively indicate so
by a dated signature solely for that purpose." 9 When the purchase
is voluntary the lender must clearly and conspicuously disclose
that the purchase of insurance is not required and must also dis-
close the cost of the insurance.'20 When the purchase of insurance
is a prerequisite to and is purchased in connection with the exten-
sion of credit, the premium must be included in the finance
charge.'' The cost of insurance for the full period of coverage must
also be disclosed.
2 2
7. Deferral, delinquency and similar charges must be dis-
closed by either their amount or method of computation.
12
1
8. The most common form of security in a supervised loan
is the consumer's household furniture. A security interest in house-
hold furniture may only be taken if the security interest is identi-
fied in writing and signed, in person, by the consumer and the
consumer's spouse.' The WVCCPA fails to define household fur-
"' 12 C.F.R. § 226.4(a)(5)(ii) (1977).
' Id.
'" Id. § 226.4(a)(5).
,, Id. See also W. VA. CODE9 § 46-A-3-109 (1976 Replacement Vol.) (insurance
as related to allowable additional charges).
1- 12 C.F.R. § 226.8(b)(4) (1977). In West Virginia delinquency charges on
precomputed supervised loans can be formulated by way of two alternative meth-
ods. One places a ceiling of $5.00 or 5% of the amount of each delinquent install-
ment due for more than ten days. The other method bases the delinquency charge
on the formula provided for the computation of deferral charges:
Amount of loan finance Number of months
charge attributable to X in the deferral - Delinquency
the delinquent install- period. Charge
ment.
Where the loan is payable in unequal or irregular installments the deferral charge
is calculated in accordance with the Rule of 78's. See W. VA. CODE § 46A-3-112 (1976
Replacement Vol.) (delinquency charges on precomputed loans); W. VA. CODE §
46A-3-113) (1976 Replacement Vol.) (delinquency charges on nonprecomputed
loans); W. VA. CODE § 46A-3-114 (Replacement Vol. 1976) (deferral charges);
[1974] 4 CoNs. CRED. GUIDE (CCH) W. Va. 6514-6515.
" W. VA. CODE § 46A-4-109(3) (1976 Replacement Vol.). For disclosure pur-
poses property which is designated as security must be clearly identified. See 12
C.F.R. § 226.8(b)(5) (1977).
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niture so it is not clear whether such items as kitchen appliances
are includable in this requirement.' The WVCCPA places a blan-
ket prohibition on the use of land or an assignment of wages as
security for a supervised loan.'
9. Consumers have a right to prepay in full the unpaid bal-
ance of a supervised loan without penalty. 7 Prepayment in full
also entitles the consumer to rebate of that portion of the finance
charge "attributable to the prepaid monthly installments" accord-
ing to the Rule of 78's.118 This too must be disclosed.
POSTNEGOTIATION
In the postnegotiation phase of a supervised loan the obliga-
tion is still executory and the consumer is presumably making
periodic payment. The supervised lender, on the other hand, is still
obligated on the loan and, in addition, may be required to fulfill
or comply with certain statutorily created duties. This discussion
will focus on three of the more significant duties still owed the
consumer by the lender: the duty to properly bill the consumer and
respond to consumer inquiries, the lender's duty to notify the con-
sumer of the consumer's right to cure when in default, and the
"' W. VA. CODE § 46A-4-109(3) (Replacement Vol. 1976).
'' Id. § 46A-4-109(l)(2).
"= Id. § 46A-3-110.
12 Id. § 46A-3-111(2).
The degree to which the amount of each scheduled installment includes the
finance charge is dependent on a shrinking scale; the earler the installment while
the agreement is executory, the greater it contributes to the payment of the finance
charge. Consequently, the WVCCPA imposes the Rule of 78's in order to determine
the amount the finance charge relates to each installment. This is computed with
the following formula for a one year loan:
Number of Installments - The portion of the finance charge to be
Still Outstanding applied to the most recent installment
78 owing.
If a consumer was to prepay in full on the date the seventh installment was due in






15/78 = portion of the total finance charge which must be rebated to the
consumer.
See generally B. CusoAN, supra note 1, at 23.
[Vol. 80
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lender's obligation to refrain from abusive debt collection prac-
tices.
a. Supervised Lender Billings
The Fair Credit Billing Act,' 9 as part of the Federal Consumer
Credit Protection Act, provides uniform procedures for requiring
extenders of consumer credit to respond to and, if required, correct
billing errors alleged by consumers. The F.C.B.A. is primarily de-
signed to deal with instances of computerized billing errors inci-
dent to a revolving credit agreement such as a credit card.'3 ' In the
context of the West Virginia supervised loan, the F.C.B.A. is not
likely to come into operation as often as in the revolving credit
situation because lenders generally provide consumers with pay-
ment booklets which do not require periodic billings. However,
supervised lenders can be expected to: (1) address correspondence
to consumers, (2) deliver written receipts to the consumer when
payment is made with currency, and (3) respond to consumer in-
quiries when the principal owing on a supervised loan is in dis-
pute.'3 ' In such a situation the F.C.B.A. is potentially applicable
and will guarantee the consumer a right to challenge alleged billing
errors and require that affirmative responsive action be taken by
supervised lenders.'32
In 15 U.S.C. § 1666 (Cum. Supp. 1977).
"3 See generally Note, Consumer Protection: The Fair Credit Billing Act, 28
OKLA. L. REv. 586 (1975).
"I Those provisions of the Federal Reserve Board's Regulation Z which imple-
ment the F.C.B.A., as presently written and interpreted, do not govern all West
Virginia supervised loans. Regulation Z contains the additional requirement that a
billing statement be "periodic" in order to be governed by the fair credit billing
provisions. 12 C.F.R. § 226.2(j) (1977). In addition, the staff of the Federal Reserve
Board has interpreted the F.C.B.A. as applicable only in those situations in which
"a creditor is extending open-end credit or is extending credit by use of a credit
card." [1974-1977 Transfer Binder] CONS. CRED. GUIDE (CCH) 31,286. This inter-
pretation is, however, subject to challenge. While the F.C.B.A.'s legislative history
does suggest that it was prompted by billing abuses "brought on by the rapid
increase in revolving or open-end credit plans which bill consumers on a monthly
basis," there is no suggestion that it was limited to such situations. S. REP. No.
278, 93rd Cong., 1st Ses. 3 (1973). The F.C.B.A. speaks simply of "creditors"
which, by definition, includes supervised lenders who extend credit payable in more
than four installments. See 15 U.S.C. § 1666(a) (1978 Supp.) Thus, any
"statement" reflecting the status of a credit agreement, whether issued periodically
or not, should come under the F.C.B.A. regardless of how it is characterized. See
also W. VA. CODE § 46A-2-114 (1976 Replacement Vol.) (provides for nondiscre-
tionary issuance of receipts, statements of account and evidence of payment in
specified situations applicable to supervised lenders).
,"I See Littlefield, Federal Consumer Credit Legislation-New Developments,
80 COM. L.J. 312 (1975).
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The F.C.B.A. establishes four "billing errors," relevant to su-
pervised loans, with which a consumer may invoke its protections:
(1) a statement of an extension of credit either not made or in the
wrong amount; (2) a bill's failure to properly reflect a payment or
credit attributable to the consumer; (3) an error in computation
or accounting; and (4) where a consumer simply wants clarification
of a statement with the possible inclusion of documentary evi-
dence.'33 A consumer, having discovered one of the aforementioned
errors, must then notify the supervised lender in writing within
sixty days from when the bill was mailed.134 The consumer's notice
must meet several criteria in order to be effective. The writing
must be independent of a payment medium supplied by the super-
vised lender.3 5 It must set forth the consumer's name, account
number, an allegation of the billing error and the reasons for the
consumer's belief that there is, in fact, a billing error. 36
If the consumer manages to meet all of the criteria, the super-
vised lender is now obligated to acknowledge acceptance of the
consumer's notice within thirty days of receipt.'37 The lender must
then comply with one of two alternatives within two of the loan's
billing cycles. If the lender agrees with the consumer, the lender
must correct the errors and notify the consumer with an explana-
tion of the correction.' If the lender disagrees with the consumer,
an investigation must be conducted by the lender and a written
response explaining the reasons why the lender believes the bill to
be accurate must be sent to the consumer.' 3'
The safeguards implemented by the F.C.B.A. are obvious: to
institutionalize uniform procedures for consumers to dispute bills
Is' 15 U.S.C. § 1666(b) (Cum. Supp. 1977).
13' 15 U.S.C. § 1666(a) (Cum. Supp. 1977).
Is$ Id.
I:' !d.
15 U.S.C. § 1666(a)(3)(A)(B) (Cum. Supp. 1977).
" ' 15 U.S.C. § 1666(a)(3)(B)(i) (Cum. Supp. 1977).
,3, 15 U.S.C. § 1666(a)(3)(B)(ii) (Cum. Supp. 1977). The consumer's original
notice has the effect of barring the lender from reporting or threatening to report
the consumer's challenge to any third party if it would affect the consumer's credit
rating. Even if the lender has completed the requirements of the second alternative
described, and the consumer renews his or her complaint, the lender may only
report the delinquency in payment to a third party if it is concomitantly reported
that the amount is in dispute. In addition, the consumer must be supplied the name
and address of each party who is notified of the delinquency. Lenders are also
required to report the subsequent resolution of disputed bills to all of those who
received notice of delinquency. See 15 U.S.C. § 1666(a), (b), (c) (Cum. Supp. 1977).
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and to prevent unscrupulous lenders from threatening the credit
rating of a consumer in order to discourage consumer complaints.
Lenders risk forfeiting the right to collect the disputed installment
(but not in excess of fifty dollars) for failing to comply with the
F.C.B.A.'40 The principal failure of the F.C.B.A. is that consumers
are only afforded its protections if they meet its stringent notice
requirements. Consequently, if a consumer disputes a bill over the
telephone, the consumer will not be protected by the F.C.B.A."'
A more realistic approach would be to require supervised lenders
to disclose the notice requirement for challenging a bill as part of
the initial agreement and each subsequent bill.
b. Default
There are a multiplicity of reasons why consumers default on
credit agreements. Those most often cited are illness and unem-
ployment.'42 Others range from such fortuitous events as a break-
down in domestic relations to the intentional use of nonpayment
as the only available method to dispute a bill.' Basically, a con-
sumer is considered to be in default on a supervised loan in West
Virginia when the consumer has failed to make payments for more
than five days after a scheduled payment is due.' Default has the
effect of triggering the WVCCPA notice requirements which are
intended to cut down on the disproportionally high number of
default judgments in consumer credit transactions.'
Before a West Virginia supervised lender pursues either judi-
cial or extra-judicial remedies following a default, the WVCCPA
provides that the lender "may" give the consumer written notice
by delivering or mailing it to the consumer's last known address.'
This notice must conspicuously identify the creditor, transaction
and the consumer's right to cure default and how the cure may be
" Id. § 1666(e).
"' Id. § 1666(a)(1) - (3).
,42 NATIONAL COMMISSION ON CONSUMER FINANCE, supra note 3, at 43; D. CAPLO-
vrrz, CONSUMERS IN TROUBLE: A STUDY OF DEBTORS IN DEFAULT (1973).
Rester, Regulating Debt Collection Practices: The Social and Economic
Needs and a Congressional Response, 11 CL. HOUSE REV. 547, 548 (1977).
"I However, this consideration can only be determined by implication from a
reading of W. VA. CODE § 46A-2-106 (Replacement Vol. 1976).
" W. VA. CODE § 46A-2-106 (Replacement Vol. 1976). For a thorough discus-
sion on the high incidence of default judgments in consumer credit transactions see
Note, Due Process Denied: Consumer Default Judgments in New York City, 10
CoLUM. J. L. Soc. PROS. 370, 378-81 (1974).
' W. VA. CODE § 46A-2-106.
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accomplished. A literal reading of the provision may lead one to
believe that the notice of the consumer's right to cure is discretion-
ary with the supervised lender because of the word "may." How-
ever, the section further provides that
a creditor may not accelerate maturity of the unpaid balance
of the obligation, commence any action or demand or take pos-
session of collateral on account of default until ten days after
notice has been given to the consumer of his right to cure such
default.1
7
Unless a supervised lender wishes to forego all rights following a
default, the lender must give the consumer notice of the right to
cure.
A significant issue raised by the right to cure provision is
whether the notice requirement constitutes a jurisdictional condi-
tion precedent. Furthermore, must compliance with the provision
be pleaded in order for a West Virginia circuit court to maintain
subject matter jurisdiction of a supervised lender's action for a
default judgment? Barring judicial interpretation, neither of these
issues can be answered with assurance. Nonetheless, it must be
noted that the circuit courts' general subject matter jurisdiction is
modified by "such other jurisdiction . . . as is or may be pre-
scribed by law. 14 8 Moreover, the Supreme Court of Appeals has
held in other contexts that when the procedure for instituting an
action is clearly prescribed by statute, "the failure to observe even
a substantial compliance . . . [is] of such nature as to render
judgment void for lack of jurisdiction."
'
Treating a notice of default and right to cure as a jurisdic-
tional condition precedent was a concept incorporated in the provi-
sions of the most recent version of the Uniform Consumer Credit
Code.1" The U.C.C.C. expressly prescribes that fulfillment of the
147 Id.
", W. VA. CONsT. art. VII § 12.
' Duncan v. Tucker County Bd. of Ed., 149 W. Va. 285, 292, 140 S.E.2d 613,
618 (1965) (statute governing writs of mandamus); see also Brinkley v. Brinkley,
147 W. Va. 557, 129 S.E.2d 436 (1963) (failure to allege residency in divorce proceed-
ing).
'w The Uniform Consumer Credit Code was originally approved by the Na-
tional Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws and the American Bar
Association in the summer of 1968. The most recent version of the U.C.C.C. was
adopted by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws in
1974, and by the American Bar Association in 1975. It was one of the principal
sources upon which the WVCCPA was drafted.
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notice requirement be specifically pled 1' so that "the consumer
treceives] enough information to understand his predicament and
to encourage him to take appropriate steps to alleviate it."'52 The
inclusion of a notice of default and right to cure provision in the
WVCCPA suggests that it implicitly adopts the U.C.C.C.'s ration-
ale that such mandatory notice, prior to the commencement of any
creditor action, is an effective means of squelching the large num-
ber of default judgments awarded in consumer credit situations.
Its elevation to the status of a notice requirement, complementary
to the notice provided by service of process, which is necessary for
the maintenance of subject matter jurisdiction in a circuit court,
is totally consistent with this delineation.'53
c. Debt Collection
The debt collection process is traditionally regarded as one of
the areas of consumer credit most subject to abuse. Congress has
stated that
[t]here is abundant evidence of the use of abusive, deceptive,
and unfair debt collection practices by many debt collectors.
Abusive debt collection practices contribute to the number of
personal bankruptcies, to marital instability, to the loss of jobs,
and to invasions of individual privacy. 5'
Debt collection is one of the areas of consumer credit, in relation
"I' See U.C.C.C. § 5.110 (1974 version) (notice of right to cure); U.C.C.C. §
5.111 (1974 version) (means of cure); U.C.C.C. § 5.114 (1974 version) (pleading
requirements in actions instituted by creditors).
512 U.C.C.C. § 5.110 (Comment 1) (1974 version).
Studies that have been performed of consumers who have legal action
brought against them show a high rate of judgments taken by default, in
excess of 90 per cent in some urban areas. Modem rules of procedure that
require a complaint to contain only the barest of facts contemplate con-
tested litigation. In the event judgment is taken by default there is not
enough information in the pleadings to enable the court to enter an accur-
ate award.
Id. § 5.114 (Comment).
10 Indeed, in interpreting an Iowa Code provision similar to West Virginia's,
the Iowa Attorney General stated that
[t]he cure notice requirements do not affect a person's right in the con-
tract but merely have to do with the procedure that the creditor uses in
enforcing his rights. The creditor has the same basic cause of action that
he had before the credit code was passed, but there is a certain procedure
now which must be followed which did not exist previously.
75 Op. Iowa Att'y Gen. 339 (1975).
M 15 U.S.C. § 1692(a) (Cum. Supp. 1977).
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to supervised lenders, most comprehensively addressed by the
WVCCPA.1" As previously noted, anyone undertaking the direct
collection of payments from a consumer in default pursuant to a
supervised loan must first be licensed as a supervised lender with
the Commissioner of Banking.' Thus, only after having been li-
censed as a supervised lender, may a corporation or individual
undertake the collection of debts subject to the following prohib-
ited practices: (1) the practice of law by debt collectors;'57 (2) the
use of threats or coercion by debt collectors;' (3) the use of the
telephone and the use of obscene language by debt collectors;' 5 (4)
unreasonable publicity of the consumers by debt collectors;' 0 (5)
fraudulent and deceptive representations by debt collectors;'"' (6)
the use of unfair and unconscionable means in debt collection;' 2
and (7) misuse of the mails.' 3
Independent collection agencies who contract with supervised
lenders are also subject to regulation and potential liability under
the recently enacted Fair Debt Collection Practices Act.'"' The
F.D.C.P.A. contains a comprehensive "laundry list" of prohibited
debt collection practices. The scope of the F.D.C.P.A. is regulation
of those who engage in "any business the principal purpose of
which is the collection of any debts, or who regularly collects or
attempts to collect . . . debts owed . . . another.""' Conse-
quently, the direct in-house collection practices of West Virginia
supervised lenders are not regulated by the F.D.C.P.A.
One of the more innovative provisions of the F.D.C.P.A. is a
notice mechanism which provides consumers with the opportunity
to dispute the validity of a debt. Debt collectors must, within five
days of their initial communication with the consumer, send the
consumer written notice containing the amount of the debt, the
" "Debt Collection" is defined as "any action, conduct or practice of soliciting
claims for collection or in the collection of claims owed or due or alleged to be owed
or due to a creditor by a consumer". W. VA. CODE § 4A-2-122 (1976 Replacement
Vol.).
' W. VA. CODE § 46A-4-101(2) (1976 Replacement Vol.).
'7 W. VA. CODE § 46A-2-123 (1976 Replacement Vol.).
'' Id. § 46A-2-124.
Id. § 46A-2-125.




"' Pub. L. No. 95-109 (1977); [hereinafter cited as F.D.C.P.A.].
" Id. § 803(6).
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name of the creditor and a statement that the collector will assume
the debt to be valid unless the consumer disputes it within thirty
days of receipt."' The notice must also inform the consumer that
by disputing the bill within the thirty-day period the debt collector
will provide the consumer with a verification of the debt or copy
of the judgment, and that the consumer has a right to request and
receive the name and address of the original creditor. ' A written
response by a consumer has the effect of barring the collection of
the debt until the debt collector complies with the notice require-
ment.68
CONCLUSION
The evolution of the supervised (small) loan appears to have
gone full circle. It was created in the early 1900's as a means of
making small quantities of cash credit commercially feasible for
the legitimate lender. With roots in the seminal recommendations
of the Russell Sage Foundation, the supervised loan was exempted
from general usury requirements in order to increase its availabil-
ity to consumers in a more competitive market. Today, the West
Virginia supervised loan is but one part of a comprehensive con-
sumer credit and protection code which is supplemented by a vari-
ety of federal laws. If any trend is to be identified from the multi-
farious forms of regulation discussed in this Note, it must be that,
if not at the present, then surely in the near future every significant
aspect of the consumer/supervised lender relationship will be regu-
lated. Furthermore, such regulation is markedly designed to place
consumers in a more equal bargaining position with lenders.
It is difficult to conclusively determine what impact compre-
hensive regulation will have on the supervised loan market. In 1977
supervised lenders reported $75,930,000 in net loans outstanding as
opposed to $60,274,000 in 1967.19 However this increase must be
considered in light of the passage of the WVCCPA in 1974 which
increased the allowable maximum principal amount of supervised
loans from $800.00 to $1,200.00.Y°1 On the other hand, figures on the
number of supervised lenders in West Virginia are more telling. In
,66 Id. § 809(a).
667 Id.
' Id. § 809(b).
'' Telephone conversations with Wendell Higgens and William Curley, offi-
cials of the West Virginia Banking Commission (April 10, 1978) (data from the
records of the Banking Commission).
,, W. VA. CODE § 46A-4-111 (Replacement Vol. 1976).
28
West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 80, Iss. 2 [1978], Art. 7
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol80/iss2/7
WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW
1977 there were approximately 155 licensed supervised lenders as
opposed to 210 in 1967.171 This 26% decrease in the number of
supervised lenders, without any noticeable decrease in the volume
of money lent, bolsters the view that intensive regulation results




The determination of whether, in the long run, compehensive
protective regulation actually hurts consumers by reducing the
availability of credit will require further experience. In the mean-
time, it is safe to conclude that the West Virginia consumer who
walks through the door of a supervised loan office is likely to be
better equipped, have a greater store of legal rights, and less sub-
ject to lender abuse as a result of the WVCCPA and the wealth of
relevant federal consumer credit protection law than ever before.
Jon David Levy
':' Telephone conversations, supra note 169.
11 This position was adopted in the Report of the National Commission on
Consumer Finance in 1972:
In general, any kind of market imperfection-any restriction which
tends to inhibit the free interactions of potential borrowers and suppliers
of credit-can have a potential effect on credit availability. Such market
imperfections include legal constraints, regardless of intent, as well as
noncompetitive behavior of suppliers. Legal factors of most potential
significance are rate ceilings, restrictions on other credit terms such as
loan size and maturity, limitations on creditors' remedies, and legal con-
straints on the entry of new firms.
NATIONAL COMUSSION ON CoNsuMER FNANcE, supra note 3, at 113.
[Vol. 80
29
Levy: Consumer Law--The Supervised Loan in West Virginia
Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1978
